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Abstract. We describe a shared control methodology that can, with-
out knowledge of the task, be used to improve a human’s control of a
dynamic system, be used as a training mechanism, and be used in con-
junction with Imitation Learning to generate autonomous policies that
recreate novel behaviors. Our algorithm introduces autonomy that as-
sists the human partner by enforcing safety and stability constraints.
The autonomous agent has no a priori knowledge of the desired task and
therefore only adds control information when there is concern for the
safety of the system. We evaluate the efficacy of our approach with a hu-
man subjects study consisting of 20 participants. We find that our shared
control algorithm significantly improves the rate at which users are able
to successfully execute novel behaviors. Experimental results suggest that
the benefits of our safety-aware shared control algorithm also extend to
the human partner’s understanding of the system and their control skill.
Finally, we demonstrate how a combination of our safety-aware shared
control algorithm and Imitation Learning can be used to autonomously
recreate the demonstrated behaviors.
Keywords: Human-Robot Interaction, Machine Learning, Optimiza-
tion and Optimal Control
1 Introduction
Mechanical devices can be used to extend the abilities of a human operator in
many domains, from travel to manufacturing to surgery. In this work, we are
interested in developing a shared control methodology that further enhances the
ability of a human user to operate dynamic systems in scenarios that would
otherwise prove challenging due to the complexity of the control problem (e.g.,
modern aircraft), the complexity of the environment (e.g., navigation in a densely
populated area), or the skill of the user (e.g., due to physical injury). A partic-
ularly motivating domain is assistive and rehabilitation medicine. Consider, for
example, the use of an exoskeleton in rehabilitating the leg muscles of a spinal
cord injured subject [1]. While these devices are designed explicitly to aid a user
in recovering from trauma by rebuilding lost muscular control, the complexity of
the machine itself often requires that one or more physical therapists assist the
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subject in operating the device during therapy (e.g., to provide stabilization).
Artificial intelligence can further improve the efficacy of these devices by incor-
porating autonomy into the control loop to reduce the burden on the human
user. That is, if the autonomous agent accounts for subpar (and potentially dan-
gerous) control input, the human operator and therapist(s) are freed to focus on
important therapeutic skills.
In this work, we improve the effectiveness of joint human-machine systems by
developing a safety-aware shared control (SaSC) algorithm that assists a human
operator in controlling a dynamic machine without a priori knowledge of the hu-
man’s desired objective. In general, shared control is a paradigm that can be used
to produce human-machine systems that are more capable than either partner
on their own [2]. However, in practice, shared control systems often require the
autonomous agent to know the goal (or a set of discrete, potential goals). While
a priori knowledge of a desired set of goals may be a valid assumption in some
domains, it can also be a severely limiting assumption in many other scenarios.
Therefore, instead of allocating control based on whether the human operator’s
input will improve the likelihood of achieving a goal, we aim to allocate control
based on whether the user’s control commands will lead to dangerous states and
actions in the future. Under this paradigm, the autonomous partner develops
a control strategy that is only concerned with the safety of the system, and is
otherwise indifferent to the control of the human operator.
Our safety-aware shared control algorithm can be used to improve the efficacy
of human-machine systems in two main ways:
G1. Improve a human operator’s control, and understanding, of a dynamic sys-
tem in complex and potentially unsafe environments.
G2. Improve the value of Imitation Learning (IL) in the same domains, both
by facilitating demonstration and addressing the covariate shift problem [3].
Item G1 is important because control challenges can stem from a variety of
issues including the inherent complexity of the system, the required fidelity in
the control signal, or the physical limitations of the human partner. For this rea-
son, there is often an explicit need for assistance from an autonomous partner
in controlling the mechanical device. Item G2 is important because Imitation
Learning can be used to further extend the capabilities of human-machine sys-
tems, however demonstration may not always be feasible for the human partner
given the aforementioned control challenges.
The main contribution of this work is a safety-aware shared control algorithm
that improves the efficacy of human-machine collaboration in complex environ-
ments, with the key feature that it is possible for the user’s desired objective to
remain unknown. In this algorithm, an autonomous partner accounts for system-
and environment-based safety concerns, thereby freeing the human operator to
focus their mental and physical capacities on achieving high-level goals. Our
algorithm (Section 3) describes a novel interaction paradigm that extends the
viability of complex human-machine systems in various scenarios including those
in which the human’s skill is limited or impaired. We also provide an analysis
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of our algorithm (Section 4) with a human subjects study consisting of 20 par-
ticipants conducted in a series of challenging simulated environments. Finally,
we show how the same algorithm can be used to improve the human operator’s
control skill and the power of Imitation Learning (Section 5).
2 Background and Related Work
The majority of related work in the shared control literature focuses on the de-
velopment and analysis of techniques that statically and/or dynamically allocate
control between human and robot partners. The main objective in these works
is to improve system performance while reducing the control burden on the hu-
man operator [2]. In some applications, the autonomous partner is allocated the
majority of the low-level control while the human operator acts in a supervi-
sory role [4] while in others, the roles are reversed, and the autonomous partner
takes on the supervisory role [5]. There is also related work in which neither
partner acts as a supervisor and instead control is shared via a mixed-initiative
paradigm. For example, researchers have developed techniques in which the au-
tonomous partner is explicitly aware of the human operator’s intention [6] as well
as techniques in which the autonomous partner has an implicit understanding
of the human operator’s control policy [7]. While these examples aim to improve
task performance, the main motivation for our work is to extend the human
operator’s control ability in domains where safety is a primary concern.
For this reason, the most closely related shared control paradigms are safety,
or context, aware. In this area, researchers have explored the impact of au-
tonomous obstacle avoidance on teleoperated robots in search and rescue [5].
Additionally, safety is a particular concern when the human and robot partner
are co-located, such as with autonomous vehicles [8]. Co-located partners are
also common in assistive robotics where researchers have developed environment-
aware smart walkers [9] to help visually-impaired people avoid dynamic obstacles.
Related to our goal of generating autonomous policies that recreate the be-
havior demonstrated during system operation, there is prior work in the field of
Imitation Learning (IL). Most commonly, the demonstration data is provided by
a human partner [10], though it can come from variety of sources including tra-
jectory optimization and simulation [11]. Example data is commonly assumed to
come from an expert (or optimal) controller [12]; however, researchers also have
explored techniques that use demonstrations provided by novice (or suboptimal)
sources [13]. In this work we describe how Imitation Learning can be used even
when the human operator is not able to provide demonstration data on their own.
We further describe how our safety-aware shared control algorithm can be used
to address the covariate shift problem [3], a common issue in Imitation Learning
that stems from the fact that the data used to train the policy may come from
a different distribution than the data observed at runtime.
Lastly, there is also related work in the subfield of safety-aware Reinforcement
Learning (RL). In this domain, safe autonomous control policies are learned from
exploration instead of demonstration. Examples include techniques that enforce
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Fig. 1: Flow chart of our Safety-aware Shared Control (SaSC) algorithm. The
operator focuses on task objectives, while the autonomy accounts for safety.
safety during the exploration process through linear temporal logic [14] and
formal methods [15]. Researchers also have explored model-free RL as a paradigm
to integrate the feedback of a human operator through the reward structure
during the learning process, and to share control with a human operator at
run-time [16]. Finally, researchers have considered learning safe policies from
demonstration by computing probabilistic performance bounds that allow an
autonomous agent to adaptively sample demonstration data to ensure safety in
the learned policy [17].
3 Safety-Aware Shared Control
In this work, we contribute a specific implementation of a class of algorithms
that we refer to as Safety-aware Shared Control (SaSC). SaSC can help users op-
erate dynamic systems in challenging and potentially unsafe environments that
would normally require expert-level control. An analogous engineering solution
is fly-by-wire control of modern aircraft [18]. In these systems, the onboard com-
puter accounts for many of the intricacies of the control problem allowing the
pilot to focus on high-level tasks. Our SaSC algorithm takes this idea a step
further to account for unsafe actions related to both the system dynamics and
the environment. Safety-aware shared control consists of two components:
1. A safe policy generation method for the autonomous agent.
2. A control allocation algorithm to safely integrate input from both partners.
The high-level algorithm is depicted in Figure 1. Points 1 and 2 are described
in more detail in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. Relevant policy notation is below:
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• pih Human operator’s policy
• pisa−a Safety-aware autonomous policy (has no task information)
• pisa−sc Safety-aware shared control policy
• piil Imitation Learning policy
• piil−sc Imitation Learning policy under safety-aware shared control
3.1 Safety-Aware Autonomous Policy Generation
To implement our safety-aware shared control algorithm, we must first develop
an autonomous control policy that is capable of safely controlling the dynamic
system in question (policy pisa−a in Section 3). In this work, we utilize Model-
based Optimal Control [19] (MbOC). MbOC learns a model of the dynamic
system directly from data, which is then incorporated into an optimal control
algorithm to produce autonomous policies. Here, we learn a model of the system
and control dynamics through an approximation to the Koopman operator [20].
Further details of this modeling technique are presented in Section 4.2.
Given a learned model of the system dynamics, we can then compute a
control policy by solving the finite-horizon nonlinear Model Predictive Control
(MPC) [21] problem defined by a cost function of the form
J(x(t), u(t)) =
∫ tf
t=0
l(x(t), u(t)) + ltf (x(t)) (1)
where
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), x(0) = x0 (2)
and f defines the nonlinear system dynamics, x(t) and u(t) are the state and
control trajectories, and l and ltf are the running and terminal costs, respectively.
To solve the optimal control problem, we use Sequential Action Control
(SAC) [22], an algorithm designed to iteratively find a single action (and time
to act) that maximally improves performance. Data-driven model-based, and
model-free, optimal control algorithms have been experimentally validated with
numerous dynamic systems [23] including joint human-machine systems [7] [16].
To address the main focus of this work, we specify a control objective that
relates only to system safety. Specifically, we use quadratic costs to deter un-
stable states and higher order polynomial penalty functions to keep the system
away from dangerous locations. Notably, the cost function does not incorporate
any task information. Therefore, if the autonomous partner’s policy is applied
directly, the system will work to maintain a safe state but will not move towards
any specific goal. The cost function used in our work is described in Section 4.2.
3.2 Safety-Aware Dynamic Control Allocation
To assist the human partner in safely controlling the dynamic system, we de-
fine an outer-loop control allocation algorithm that incorporates input signals
from the human and autonomous partners (policy pisa−sc in Section 3). There
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Algorithm 1 Safety-Aware Maxwell’s Demon Algorithm
1: if unsafe (system, environment) then
2: u = usa−a;
3: else
4: if 〈uh,usa−a〉 ≥ 0 then . When used with an IL policy
5: u = uh; . uh is replaced by uil
6: else
7: u = 0;
8: end if
9: end if
Maxwell’s
Demon
Algorithm
is, of course, a balance to strike between the control authority given to the each
partner. If the outer-loop controller is too permissive and accepts a significant
portion of the human operator’s input, it may do a poor job enforcing the neces-
sary safety requirements. However, if the outer-loop controller is too stringent, it
can negatively impact the ability of the human operator to produce their desired
motion. In this work, we balance the control authority between the human and
autonomous partners to increase the authority of the human operator when the
system is deemed to be in a safe state, and increase the authority of the auton-
omy when the system is deemed to be in a dangerous state. Here, the autonomy
adds information into the system only when it is necessary to ensure safety.
Specifically, we allocate control using a variant of Maxwell’s Demon Algo-
rithm (MDA) [24]. MDA uses information from an optimal control algorithm as
a guide by which to evaluate the input from another source. In this work, we
contribute a safety-aware variant that we call Safety-Aware MDA (Sa-MDA).
Sa-MDA is described in full in Algorithm 1. Here, unsafe(system,environment)
describes whether the system is in an unstable or dangerous configuration with
respect to the environment (e.g., through barrier functions, see Section 4.2), uh
is the input from the human partner, ua is the input produced by the autonomy,
〈·〉 is the inner product, and u is the applied control. When a learned policy is
used to mimic a demonstration uh is replaced with uil (see Section 3.3).
3.3 Safety-Aware Shared Control Imitation Learning
We now describe how we use the data collected under shared control to produce
autonomous policies through Imitation Learning [10]. The goal here is to learn
a policy piil that mimics the behavior demonstrated by the human operator. To
achieve this goal, we treat the data collected under shared control pisa−sc as a
supervisor in the policy learning process. Notably, this data, and the associated
learned policy, now contain task-relevant information, as provided by the human
operator during demonstration. Our goal, then, is to learn an autonomous policy
that minimizes the following objective
J(piil, pih) = min
θ
∑
s∈ξ∈D
||piil(s)− pih(s)||22 (3)
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where J is the cost to be minimized and s is the state. By minimizing J we learn
a policy that closely matches the policy demonstrated by the human partner.
pi(s) : s→ u defines a control policy which is parameterized by θ, pih represents
the (supervisor) human’s policy and piil represents the Imitation Learning policy.
The autonomous policy is learned from a set D of trajectory data ξ recorded
during the demonstration phase. To generate piil, we use behavior cloning [25],
a standard offline imitation learning algorithm. Details of our specific imple-
mentation are provided in Section 4.2. As described in Section 2, behavior
cloning can fail to reproduce the desired behavior due to the covariate shift
problem [3] [25]. We address this issue with an autonomous policy piil−sc that
combines the learned policy piil with the safety-aware autonomous policy pisa−a
(Algorithm 1). By incorporating the same shared control algorithm used during
data collection, we encourage the system to operate in a similar distribution of
the state space to what was observed during demonstration. One can view this
solution as a shared control paradigm in which the control is shared between
two autonomous agents: the autonomy mimicking the human control and the
autonomy enforcing safety constraints.
4 Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate the efficacy of our algorithm, we perform a human subjects study
on a simulated system exhibiting nonlinear dynamics in complex environments.
In this evaluation, we compare the efficacy of each policy presented in Section 3
except pisa−a, which is never executed and is only used to keep pih and piil safe.
4.1 Experimental System
The experimental system consists of a simulated “lunar lander” (Figure 2), cho-
sen to demonstrate the impact that shared control can have on the safety of
a joint human-machine system when the control problem and environment are
complex. The lunar lander exhibits nonlinear dynamics and can easily become
unstable as it rotates away from its point of equilibrium. Additionally, two of
the experimental environments contain obstacles that must be avoided to stay
safe (see Figure 2). The system and environment are implemented in the Box2D
physics engine based on the environment defined in OpenAI’s Gym [26].
Fig. 2: Visualization of lunar lander (enlarged) and experimental environments.
A trial is complete when the lander moves across the green line boundary.
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The lunar lander is defined by a six dimensional vector which includes the
2D position and heading (x1−3) and their rates of change (x4−6). The control
input is a continuous two dimensional vector which represents the throttle of the
main (u1) and rotational (u2) thrusters. The first environment includes only the
lunar lander and the ground surface (Fig. 2, left). This environment illuminates
the challenges associated with maintaining the stability of a complex dynamic
system, while simultaneously executing unspecified behaviors. The second envi-
ronment incorporates dynamic obstacles that obstruct the motion of the system
(Fig. 2, middle). In this environment, a series of circular obstacles move across
the screen at the same height as the lander (one at a time). The third environ-
ment includes two static obstacles that force the operator to navigate through a
narrow passageway, increasing the required control fidelity (Fig. 2, right).
4.2 Implementation Details
Model Learning We learn a model of the system and control dynamics using
an approximation to the Koopman operator [27], which has been validated on
numerous systems [23], including human-machine systems [7]. The Koopman is
a linear operator that can model all relevant features of nonlinear dynamical
systems by operating on a nominally infinite dimensional representation of the
state [20]. To approximate the true Koopman operator one must define a basis.
In this work, we define φ = [1, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, u1, u2, u1 ·x1, u1 ·x2, u1 ·x3, u1 ·
x4, u1 · x5, u1 · x6, u2 · x1, u2 · x2, u2 · x3, u2 · x4, u2 · x5, u2 · x6, u1 · cos(x3), u1 ·
sin(x3), u2 ·cos(x3), u2 ·sin(x3)], where x1−6 represent the system state variables
and u1−2 represent the control input variables. The specific basis elements used
in this work are chosen empirically and represent a reduced set of features that
describe the full state and control space, as well as the interaction between
the user’s input and the state. Data-driven methods (e.g. sparsity-promoting
DMD [28]) can be used to automatically choose a proper set of basis functions.
Safety-Aware Autonomous Policy Generation To compute an autonomous
policy that is solely concerned with the safety of the system, we define a cost
function (Equation (1)) that considers two notions of safety: stability around
points of equilibrium and collision avoidance,
l(x) =
stabilization︷ ︸︸ ︷
Diag[0, 0, 15 · x3, 1 · x4, 1 · x5, 10 · x6]2 +
obstacle avoidance︷ ︸︸ ︷
Diag[(x1 − o1), (x2 − o2), 0, 0, 0, 0]8
where (o1, o2) is the position of the nearest obstacle in 2D space. This cost func-
tion (i) penalizes states that are far from points of equilibrium using a quadratic
cost and (ii) prevents the system from entering dangerous portions of the state
space using polynomial barrier functions [29]. The stabilization term ensures that
the lunar lander does not rotate too far away from upright—if this happens, the
lander’s main thruster can no longer be used to counteract gravity, a situation
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that commonly leads to catastrophic failure in rockets. We therefore penalize
both the position and velocity of the heading term. We additionally penalize the
x and y velocity terms as momentum can significantly reduce the time a con-
troller has to avoid collision. Finally, the obstacle avoidance term simply acts to
repel the system from the nearest obstacle. Importantly, if this policy is applied
on its own (without any input from the human partner), the lander will simply
attempt to hover in a safe region, and will not advance towards any goal state.
Notably, the safety-aware autonomous policy only adds information into the
control loop when the system is deemed to be unsafe (see Algorithm 1). Other-
wise the user’s commands are, at most, simply blocked by the autonomy. This
can be thought of as an accept-reject-replace shared control paradigm [30]. We
define the unsafe function based on an empirically chosen distance to the nearest
obstacle. Therefore, if the system gets too close to an obstacle, the autonomy’s
signal is sent to the system, otherwise the human’s input is accepted or rejected,
according to the MDA filter. Here we note that the structure and weights in
the defined cost function, as well as the pre-defined distance metric, are specific
to the experimental system; however, there are generalizable principles that can
be used to develop similar cost function for other systems. For example, system
stability can generally be improved by defining costs that help reduce dynamic
features to kinematic features, while obstacle avoidance terms can be defined
using additional information from the learned system model.
Imitation Learning A neural network is used to learn a control policy that
mimics successful trials demonstrated by the human partner. The input is the
current state (x1−6) and the output is the control signal (u1−2) sent to the
system. The control signal is discretized (−1.0 to 1.0 in increments of 0.5) and the
problem is therefore cast as a classification instead of regression. There are three
hidden layers in the neural network—the first has 32 nodes, and the following
two layers have 64 nodes. Each hidden layer uses ReLu as an activation function.
The final layer uses a softmax activation. We use categorical cross entropy to
compute the loss and RMSProp as the optimizer.
4.3 Study Protocol
The human subjects study consisted of 20 participants (16 female, 4 male).
All subjects gave their informed consent and the experiment was approved by
Northwestern University’s Institutional Review Board. Each participant pro-
vided demonstrations of novel behaviors in all three of the environments, under
both a user-only control paradigm and our safety-aware shared control paradigm.
There was no goal location specified to the participants; instead a trial was con-
sidered complete when the human operator navigated the lunar lander across a
barrier defined by the green line in the environment (see Figure 2). The specific
trajectory taken by the lander during a demonstration was up to the participant.
The operator used a PS3 controller to interact with the system. The joystick
controlled by the participant’s dominant hand fired the main thruster, and the
opposing joystick fired the side thrusters.
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Subjects were asked to provide 10 demonstrations per environment (3 total)
and per control paradigm (2 total), resulting in a total of 60 demonstrations per
participant. The environments were presented in a randomized and counterbal-
anced order. Participants were assigned to one of two groups, where Group A (10
subjects) provided demonstration data in each environment under user-only con-
trol first, and Group B (10 subjects) provided demonstration data under shared
control first. Group assignment was random and balanced across subjects.
5 Experimental Results
We find that our SaSC algorithm significantly improves the user’s skill with
respect to a no-assistance baseline (Figure 3). Additionally, we find that our
SaSC algorithm can be used as a training mechanism to improve a subject’s
understanding and control of the dynamic system (Table 2). Finally, we show
how the same shared control technique can be used to extend the Imitation
Learning paradigm (Figure 4 and 5). These findings are discussed in detail in
the following subsections.
5.1 Safety-Aware Shared Control Enables Successful Demonstration
To address item G1, the primary metric we evaluate is a binary indicator of
control competency: the occurrence of safe, successful demonstrations, indicated
by navigating the lunar lander beyond the green border. We first analyze data
collected from all three experimental environments together. We then segment
the data based on the specific environment in which it was collected and re-
perform our analysis (Figure 3). We use the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test to statistically analyze the data.
Fig. 3: Average fraction of successful trials under each control paradigm in each
environment. The plots represent data collected in all environments (left), and
broken down by each individual environment (right). In all cases, participants un-
der the shared control paradigm provide safe demonstrations significantly more
often than under the user-only control paradigm (*** : p < 0.005).
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The results of the statistical tests revealed that our described shared control
paradigm significantly improved the human partner’s control skill (p < 0.005).
In particular, we find that participants provided safe demonstrations of the de-
sired behavior in 96.0% of the trials produced under the shared control paradigm
versus 38.5% of the trials produced under the user-only control paradigm. Ad-
ditionally, the statistically significant result holds when we compare the control
paradigms in each experimental environment separately (p < 0.005 in all cases).
Recall that the shared control paradigm does not provide any task -related
assistance, but rather only safety-related assistance. We therefore interpret the
increase in task success as evidence that our SaSC algorithm helps subjects ex-
hibit greater control skill, and an associated increased ability to provide demon-
strations of novel behaviors. Additionally, we note that in some experiments
conducted under user-only control, subjects were not able to provide any suc-
cessful demonstrations in a given environment. This suggests that safety-aware
shared control may be a requirement for functional usage of dynamic systems in
some of the more challenging domains that motivate this work. This finding is
also important when considering our ability to train autonomous policies that
mimic behaviors demonstrated by the human operator (see Section 5.4).
5.2 Impact of Safety-Aware Shared Control on Trajectory Features
As discussed in Section 3.2, safety-aware shared control impacts features of the
trajectories produced by the human operator. For example, by rejecting a major-
ity of the user’s inputs the SaSC algorithm can ensure system safety, but it will
not allow the user to execute desired behaviors. To evaluate how our SaSC algo-
rithm impacts the user’s abilities to demonstrate a novel behavior, we compare
a number of quantitative metrics that go beyond safety and relate specifically
to features of the trajectories (Table 1). Here, we analyze only the successful
demonstrations provided under each control paradigm.
Metric Control Env 1. Env 2. Env 3
Path Length (m)
User 30.0 ±2.4 33.8 ±4.8 28.3 ±0.8
Shared 27.7 ±1.1 34.4 ±2.3 30.5 ±2.2
Trial Time (s)
User 15.5 ±3.5 18.6 ±5.6 22.4 ±5.9
Shared 27.0 ±7.8 30.0 ±7.4 30.4 ±6.8
Final Speed (m/s)
User 23.6 ±6.8 23.8 ±6.2 14.5 ±5.0
Shared 7.9 ±2.8 9.6 ±4.5 7.9 ±1.9
Final Heading (deg)
User 45.5 ±73.5 79.5 ±79.8 39.6 ±46.0
Shared 2.7 ±10.4 6.4 ±22.0 3.5 ±5.9
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of trajectory metrics computed from
successful demonstrations. Path length is not impacted significantly by SaSC,
but shared control does result in trajectories that take longer to execute, have
slower final speeds, and are more upright (stable) in their final configurations.
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Our analysis shows that the safety-aware shared control paradigm impacts
not only the ability of a user to provide demonstrations, but also how they
provide demonstrations. In all environments, we find that participants produced
trajectories of nearly equal length under both control paradigms. However, under
the user-only control paradigm participants produced successful demonstrations
in less time, with a greater final speed and in a state that is rotated further
away from the point of equilibrium than under the shared control paradigm.
Moreover, in Environments 1 and 2 (the less constrained environments), partic-
ipants were able to produce demonstrations that were safe over the course of
the demonstrated trajectory, but unstable in the final configuration. While these
were counted as successful demonstrations, they require less control skill than
trajectories that end in a stable configuration. This suggests that SaSC improves
control skill in ways not fully captured by the binary success metric.
5.3 Safety-Aware Shared Control as a Training Mechanism
As a final piece of analysis addressing item G1, we examine whether experience
under a safety-aware shared control algorithm improves human skill learning. To
evaluate this idea, we compare the user-only control trials of Group A (user-only
condition first) with those of Group B (user-only control condition second). We
segment the data based on the specific environment in which it was collected and
use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to statistically analyze the results.
We display data and the results of the described statistical tests in Table 2.
The important take-away from these results is that shared control allows
users to operate human-machine systems safely during their own skill learning,
and that this practice then translates to skill retention when the assistance is
removed. In the most challenging environment, Environment 3, we see the largest
raw difference (+18%) in success rate between the two cohorts and a statistically
significant result (p < 0.005). Notably, zero participants provided any successful
demonstrations in this environment when the data was provided under the user-
only control paradigm first. We also see a relatively large, but not statistically
significant, difference in raw percentage points in Environments 1 and 2 (+10%
and +9%) which might become statistically significant with more data.
Under this paradigm, we can allow users to learn naturally while simulta-
neously ensuring the safety of both partners. For systems where failure during
learning is not acceptable (e.g., exoskeleton balancing), safety-aware shared con-
User-Only First User-Only Second Difference Stat. Significance
Env 1. 67 % 77 % +10 % p > 0.05
Env 2. 35 % 44 % +9 % p > 0.05
Env 3. 0 % 18 % +18 % p < 0.005
All 34 % 46 % +12 % p = 0.06
Table 2: Average success rate under user-only control over time.
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trol becomes a requirement in enabling human skill acquisition: without some
sort of safety assistance, operators are simply not able to control the system.
5.4 Safety-Aware Shared Control Improves Imitation Learning
To address item G2, we examine whether learned policies are capable of re-
producing the behavior demonstrated by the human operator. Our evaluation
is based on a comparison of trajectories generated by Imitation Learning with
(piil−sc) and without (piil) safety-aware shared control at runtime. We provide
visualizations of 10 successful reproductions of the demonstrated behaviors in
Environments 2 and 3 in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
Notably, all trajectories produced by piil−sc safely avoid both the static and
dynamic obstacles. In Figure 4 we see that the learned policy piil−sc is able
to mimic the behavior demonstrated by the human operator. In Figure 5, we
include visualizations of the trajectories provided under user-only control (pih)
and Imitation Learning without shared control (piil) in Environment 3. Here,
we also see that the user was unable to provide any successful demonstrations
without safety assistance. Similarly, the learned control policy (piil) was unable
to avoid obstacles in the environment without the safety assistance.
These two final points elucidate the need for our safety-aware shared control
system in both the demonstration and imitation phases. Without assistance from
the SaSC algorithm, not only is the human operator unable to demonstrate
desired behaviors, but the learned neural network policy fails to generalize.
Fig. 4: Environment 2. A visualization of data provided by the human part-
ner under safety-aware shared control (pisa−sc : blue) and trajectories produced
autonomously (piil−sc : pink) using the learned control policy. The vertical and
horizontal position of the dynamic obstacles (black) over time are also displayed.
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Fig. 5: Environment 3. Visualization of (1) demonstrations provided under the
user-only control paradigm (pih : yellow), (2) demonstrations provided under our
safety-aware shared control paradigm (pisa−sc : blue), (3) trajectories produced
autonomously using solely the Imitation Learning policy (piil : purple, learned
from pisa−sc demonstrations), and (4) trajectories produced autonomously using
the safety aware shared control imitation learning policy (piil−sc : pink).
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we contribute a shared control paradigm that allows users to pro-
vide demonstrations of desired actions in scenarios that would otherwise prove
too difficult due to the complexity of the control problem, the complexity of the
environment, or the skill of the user. We solve this problem through the appli-
cation of shared control, allowing a human operator to provide demonstrations
while an autonomous partner ensures the safety of the system. We validate our
approach with a human subjects study comprised of 20 participants.
The results of our human subjects study show that our safety-aware shared
control paradigm is able to help human partners provide demonstrations of novel
behaviors in situations in which they would otherwise not be able (Figure 3). Ad-
ditionally, we find that our SaSC algorithm can be used as a training mechanism
to improve a human operator’s control skill by ensuring safety during training
(Table 2). Furthermore, we find that a combination of Imitation Learning with
our safety-aware shared control paradigm produces autonomous policies that are
capable of safely reproducing the demonstrated behaviors. In this work, the au-
tonomous policies are learned from data provided under shared control and for
this reason, one must also consider how the autonomy affects the demonstration
data. We find that the shared control paradigm slows the average speed of the
system, but generally increases the stability (Table 1). Of course, it is also possi-
ble to learn autonomous policies from the data provide under user-only control.
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However, when system safety is a requirement (e.g. co-located human-machine
systems), shared control can be thought of as fundamental for allowing users
to provide demonstrations of new behaviors. Allowing a system to fail during
demonstration is often an unrealistic assumption with real-world systems.
In future work, we plan to explore additional uses of data collected under
a shared control paradigm in learning autonomous policies that do not rely on
continued safety assistance (e.g. as seeds in Guided Policy Search [11]). We also
plan to explore a bootstrapped notion of shared control, in which the outer-loop
autonomous controller originally considers only the safety of the joint system
and then dynamically updates to consider both the safety of the system system
and task-level metrics that describe the desired behavior of the human operator.
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